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Predicting the Effects of Korean Reunification by Examining the Fall of the Berlin Wall 
 The Berlin Wall fell on November 9th, 1989, marking the end of over 30 years of 
division between the German Democratic Republic, also known as East Germany, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, also known as West Germany. The two states were 
remarkably different: East Germany’s economy was dictated by communism, and West 
Germany’s by capitalism.1 A similar situation exists today between North and South 
Korea, with the North ruled by communism and the South by capitalistic markets.2 
Many experts believe that the two Koreas are destined to eventually reunify as well. 
However, there are widely differing opinions on how such a reunification would occur. 
Should it occur, there would be massive economic consequences, both regionally and 
globally.3 Therefore, preparation for reunification is essential.   
 By examining the fall of the Berlin Wall, one may be able to glean insight into 
how this Korean reunification may unfold. This is the essence of this study’s hypothesis: 
whether an in-depth examination of the major events surrounding the divisions of 
Germany and Korea and the effects those divisions had on each country economically 
and socially, as well as an examination of the reunification of East and West Germany, 
will provide a model for Korean reunification in the future. 
Division of Germany and Korea 
 The completion of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961 officially sealed off all 
connections residents living in communist East Germany had with the West.  
Thousands of dissatisfied East Germans had been relocating to the “island of 
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capitalism” that was West Berlin, but the East German government, fearing an 
imminent regime collapse, built a wall to prevent any more defections.4   
 The Berlin Wall was four meters tall, extending over 150 kilometers both through 
and around Berlin. More than one wall comprised the Berlin Wall, however; two walls 
were built alongside each other, with a space from 15 to 150 meters in between 
containing anti-tank barriers, a guard tower, and vehicle barriers. So fortified was the 
border that most East Germans never saw the West Berlin Wall until over thirty years 
later, when the Berlin Wall collapsed.5 
 A comparable, heavily militarized border was built between communist North 
Korea and capitalist South Korea in 1953, following the end of the Korean War. This 
border, however, is far larger and even more closely guarded than was the Berlin Wall. 
It spans 248 kilometers in length and has an average of 4 kilometers of space separating 
the two countries in what is essentially no-man’s land. It contains a very heavy military 
presence, and hundreds of deaths have occurred on both sides since the end of the 
Korean War in isolated incidents.6 
Effects of living in a communist state 
 Although the German and Korean borders were established for different reasons, 
they share a commonality in their separation of the communist regime from the more 
economically free state. Both East Germany and North Korea implemented aggressive 
measures to keep their citizens from defecting soon after their borders were built. The 
effects this isolation imposed on citizens of the communist states is notable and 
important when considering an integration with a less restrictive state. 
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 Marilyn Rueschemeyer, a professor of sociology emerita at the Rhode Island 
School of Design, conducted 14 years of research in East Germany between 1975 and 
1988. She described it as “an authoritarian state” and outlined the difficulties and 
tensions surrounding her study of sociology in East Germany, which until around the 
time of her arrival had been banned; Marxism-Leninism, Rueschemeyer explained, had 
“long substituted for social analysis.” During her research, more than once she claimed 
she was advised not to ask certain questions for fear of causing “trouble.”7  
Despite this, however, there was a certain degree of openness to be found in the 
country; feminism became more advanced than in many other Western nations due to 
the importance placed on women being in the workforce. Rueschemeyer also stressed 
that she had “unlimited” access to East Germany from West Berlin for many years, an 
unheard of privilege for visitors to North Korea.8 
 Kang Chol-hwon, a North Korean who grew up in a North Korean concentration 
camp and later defected to South Korea, describes the brutality of the North Korean 
regime in his autobiography, The Aquariums of North Korea. He asserts that the lives of 
every citizen and visitor are completely controlled by the regime, and anyone who 
condemns or criticizes the regime, resident or foreigner, is taken away to one of several 
concentration camps (which North Korea denies exist) that are scattered throughout the 
country.9 Because virtually all permissible activity in North Korea is determined by the 
state, one does not have the freedom to visit universities or conduct interviews with 
citizens at will, as Rueschemeyer did in East Germany. 
 Berlin Wall collapse 
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 Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1969 to 1974, 
has been credited for “single-handedly revers(ing) German policy toward Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union” by strongly discouraging West Germany’s policy of 
cutting all diplomatic ties with countries that chose to recognize East Germany. 
Although he would come to accept the division of Germany and ultimately make a 
treaty with the Soviet Union, Brandt also continued to advocate for “some easing of the 
barriers between the German states.”10 
 The collapse of East Germany was aided in part by the failure of its monetary 
system, something all Soviet Union regimes experienced as well; the communist 
government lost control when it instituted an “administrative distribution of resources” 
to the population instead of money, which inadvertently created a dependence on 
barterable goods like coffee and meat that was simply impossible for the government to 
control.11 
 By 1989, the iron grip that the East German government held over its population 
practically ceased to exist; more and more East Germans were allowed to visit West 
Germany, which, critically, allowed them to “see first-hand how…better life there 
was.”12 Communism had gradually become less and less popular in East Germany, and 
the frustration of East Germans with their government culminated on November 9, 
1989, when they stormed the Wall after an East German press spokesman mistakenly 
declared travel to West Berlin open to all.12 
 Could a similar revolt by North Koreans occur? The social situation differs from 
the one East Germany had in terms of the power the North Korean government 
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continues to hold over its population; the “social control, however vicious, remains 
solid,” with “few observable signs of protest,” as North Korean expert Victor Cha, who 
has visited North Korea several times, asserts. Ruling through fear, the government 
employs concentration camps throughout the country that deter citizens from speaking 
out against the regime in any form, further decreasing the chance of a large uprising.13 
 The North Korean government has, however, loosened restrictions on its citizens 
somewhat in recent years. Some citizens may own cell phones, wear Western clothing, 
or even operate their own non-state sponsored markets (an action that would have been 
severely punished a few decades ago).14 Though these freedoms are not nearly as liberal 
as the ones East Germany had bestowed to its citizens by 1989, they are progressive 
nonetheless. 
 
 
Reunification of Germany 
 Although many East Germans felt euphoria during the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall and the subsequent reunification with the more economically prosperous West 
Berlin, the feeling dissipated in subsequent. The economic costs proved to be daunting, 
and social tensions and psychological stresses brewed between West and East Germans. 
There was even a certain “nostalgia” that some East German intellectuals and writers 
shared for their old country, preferring to defend East German values instead of 
working towards advancing the reunification process.15  
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 The economic results of reunification for East Germany have been mixed. In the 
years immediately following reunification there was significant economic success in the 
form of increased wage income and productivity. However, two decades after 
reunification, East Germany continues to experience economic difficulties compared 
with West Germany: wages are lower, unemployment is twice that of West Germany, 
and competitiveness in the East German economy is low.16 Life satisfaction has also 
been reported on average to be significantly lower in the East than in West German 
federal states, partly due to the differences in unemployment mentioned previously and 
in differences in household income.17 East Germany’s lack of exposure to international 
trade also likely hampered the reunification process; two-thirds of its capital was 
worthless after reunification, following an unsuccessful attempt to equalize wages 
through public policy.18   
 Despite these lingering gaps between East and West Germany, the country as a 
whole has become a significant global power since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany 
currently has the largest GDP in Europe, and the fifth largest in the world, in terms of 
purchasing power parity. Germany also has the 15th largest labor force in the world, 
employing over 45 million people.19 Although the reunification process is still ongoing, 
the East and West German reunification has been a success overall for the country and 
its people. 
Prospects of Korean reunification 
 A variety of different factors, including factional clashes in the leadership and 
spontaneous uprisings, may precipitate a collapse of the North Korean regime. In the 
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event that North Korea does collapse, there is a possibility that it will be absorbed by 
China, thus bypassing the entire prospect of reunification with South Korea and 
resulting in a great gain in territory for China.20 China wields a significant amount of 
power in Korean relations, and reunification of the two Koreas will not happen unless 
China allows it. China fears a North Korean collapse, however, and would prefer the 
North Korean regime to continue to rule; China envisions United States responding as it 
did with the German reunification, where the United States took advantage of Germany 
by pushing its Cold War alliances closer to the failing Soviet Union. Therefore, China 
hopes to avoid a similar scenario occurring along its own borders.21 
 There is no consensus among researchers and scholars regarding exactly when, 
or even if, North Korea will collapse. Although several initiatives have been undertaken 
by the South Korean government to push for reunification, or what President Park 
Geun-hye has called “trustpolitik” (taken directly from the policies surrounding 
German reunification), there has been no progress to report whatsoever in the 
advancement of reunification. Discussions anticipating North Korea’s impending 
collapse date back more than two decades; in 1995, former CIA Director John Deutch 
said, “It is no longer a question of whether North Korea would collapse, but when.” 
Two years after this statement, the commander of U.S. forces in Korea, Gen. Gary Luck, 
said, “North Korea will disintegrate, possibly in very short order.”22   Despite those 
predictions, however, North Korea continues to exist nearly 20 years later. 
 In the event of reunification with North Korea, however, South Korea will 
undoubtedly be ill-equipped to deal with it. Economically, the two Koreas are 
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drastically different, and the over 20 million North Koreans that have been isolated 
under the communist regime for more than six decades would require a massive 
endeavor by South Korea to acclimate them to a new capitalist environment. However, 
South Korea already struggles with such acclimation today simply with a limited 
number of North Korean refugees.23 
 The United States, South Korea’s largest ally, would be forced to play a major 
role in mitigating the reunification process; however, it would have to be very careful 
not to precipitate a repeat of the Iraq War of 2003. North Korea has one of the world’s 
largest biological and chemical arsenals, as well as stockpiles of anthrax, cholera, and a 
1.2-million-man army, creating strong parallels to the situation in 2003 Iraq, and the 
United States would have to carefully balance its support of South Korea in order to 
avoid becoming involved in a second Korean War.24 
Germany as a basis for Korean reunification 
 A Korean scholar at Seoul’s Research Institute for National Reunification 
described German reunification as “a good example of the worst case” for Korean 
unification. The costs of a unification would total trillions of dollars, and economists 
worry that bridging the massive gap in incomes and living standards between the two 
countries would be insurmountable.25 
 Research indicates, however, that many South Koreans view the model of 
German reunification favorably when comparing it with their own potential 
reunification. South Korea instituted the so-called “northern policy,” modeled directly 
after West Germany’s “ostpolitik,” in an attempt to open negotiations with North 
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Korea, much as West Germany did with East Germany during the 1980s. South Korean 
politicians, scholars, journalists, and business leaders also traveled to observe the 
changes in Germany following reunification, and many Germans have been invited to 
South Korean universities and research facilities to gain more information about the 
reunification process.26 
 Former South Korean president Park Geun-hye favorably mentioned German 
reunification in a 2014 address given in Dresden, Germany, stating that “years of 
preparation by the people of East and West Germany eventually succeeded in turning 
the great dream of unification into reality” and that “these are the images of one 
Germany that encourage those of us in Korea…that unification must come on the 
Korean Peninsula.”27  However, it is not clear whether a situation similar to the 
reunification of Germany would occur; there is no evidence to suggest that the two 
Koreas would attempt to equalize wages, as was done in Germany, especially given 
that North Korea is more isolated from South Korea than East Germany was from West 
Germany. The post-reunification North Korean economy would also likely become 
more “distorted” than the post-reunification German economy, primarily because 
North Korea has had even less exposure to international trade than East Germany 
had.28 
The Present Study 
 Scholars and researchers acknowledge the striking similarities between the 
situation in Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the current situation in 
Korea. The lessons learned from uniting a divided but ethnically similar population and 
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overcoming major economic disparities will be invaluable in the event Korea finds itself 
in such a position, which many scholars and experts believe is inevitable. This is where 
a comparison between the divided Germany of the Cold War and the currently divided 
Korea can provide insight into how Korea will respond to a potential reunification, 
which would help to make the reunification as successful and smooth as possible. 
Method 
 The most significant developments pertaining to the initial divisions of Germany 
and Korea and subsequent repercussions of those divisions will be analyzed in a 
comparative case study and content analysis. The comparative case study will allow for 
a simple yet comprehensive side-by-side comparison of three major factors pertaining 
to the divisions of each country, which will aid in building a clearer picture of a 
potential future Korean reunification. These three factors are as follows: degree of 
cultural division between the two cultures, economic differences between the two 
countries, and relations between the two countries. The independent variable will be 
the information included in the comparative case study and content analysis, and the 
dependent variable will be the number of consistencies between the divisions of 
Germany and Korea. The total number of perceived commonalities and disparities will 
then be totaled in the content analysis in order to determine whether the effects of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall can be used to accurately predict Korean reunification. 
 The sources that will be used to create the comparative case study and 
subsequent content analysis have been identified using scholarly databases on the web 
and published books. Deductive reasoning will be utilized at the end of the study to 
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determine whether, based on the information included in the aforementioned sources, 
the German model for reunification can indeed predict a possible Korean reunification. 
The convergent validity and discriminant validity of the study will be measured at the 
end as well to determine and compare the results to any similar studies that embody the 
current existing literature. 
 One potential issue with this research may be the accidental inclusion of bias, as 
the scholarly articles and publications that were used to report the historical events in 
this research were included at the author’s discretion. This bias may take the form of 
either confirmation bias or publication bias. The publications and scholarly works 
which make up the foundation of this study will be reviewed by my thesis committee, 
which will help to mitigate confirmation bias; publication bias will be more difficult to 
eliminate, however, as there may be data that has not been published but would affect 
the results of this study. Therefore, measures have been taken to include sources that 
were not published but are nonetheless significant. 
 A potential sampling issue would be that the majority of the sources used in this 
study were published in English. Efforts were made to select the most prevalent and 
representative works from the existing literature for this study using the online search 
engine Nexus Lexus, which offers translations of works published in other languages; 
however, an important study that has been published in Korean or German may have 
been excluded, which could negatively impact the internal validity or construct validity 
of the study. 
Cultural divisions in Germany and Korea 
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 Germany has succeeded in reconnecting its Eastern and Western cultures. 
Interestingly, there wasn’t a significant cultural divide to begin with. While it remained 
split for 28 years, Germany was largely able to keep the framework of its culture and 
language whole. Families separated during the building of the Wall were able to reunite 
relatively easily after its fall, and no significant language barriers developed. Such 
reunions were likely aided by the fact that West Germans had been permitted to visit 
the East on a more or less routine basis, thus easing the pains of separation. Current 
literature on East and West Germany, therefore, primarily addresses governmental and 
political differences between the two, not cultural. East Germany was regarded in the 
West as “not German” because it was “authoritarian in character,” as opposed to major 
differences between the German populations.29 As a result, although its people lived 
under very different styles of rule for nearly three decades, German culture did not 
truly become a hindrance in its reunification efforts. Perhaps the most supportive aspect 
of this notion is that, despite the East German government’s sincere efforts to create a 
new state, its people continued to chant “We are one people” and demand reunification 
with the West.30 
 This is not to say, however, that cultural differences were not present between 
East and West Germany after reunification. A 2010 study for the Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization found that “East Germans appear to have a slightly greater 
dislike of hours spent working and seem to have a lower esteem for academic education 
relative to vocational education,” the result of which “may have have negative effects 
on income and growth levels.”31 The study also found that “East Germans differ from 
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West Germans in ways that may be seen to reflect values instilled during communism,” 
such as East Germans being “more favorable to being divorced or widowed.”31 In 
examining whether these cultural differences ultimately hampered the economic 
prosperity of East Germans after reunification, however, the research found no 
significant causation. One can therefore conclude that cultural differences are inevitable 
between one ethnic group living under two separate regimes, but that successful 
integration may be achieved if these differences are not too great. 
 By contrast, the situation in Korea differs dramatically. East Germans may have 
been physically separated from their Western counterparts behind the Iron Curtain, but 
their regime was not so repressive as to completely prevent information from filtering 
across the border. North Koreans, however, living under the suffocating grip of Kim 
Jong Un, are almost wholly ignorant of life in South Korea, and indeed life everywhere 
else in the world. It is true that the North Korean regime’s very survival depends on 
this repression; its people must remain convinced that their regime is the best in the 
world and that life in the South is nothing short of a living hell (when the opposite 
scenario is far closer to the truth). One 16-year-old North Korean refugee was quoted as 
saying, “In school, we were taught that people in South Korea and Japan are so poor 
that they went around selling body parts to survive.”32 The author noted that after the 
girl said this she “giggled, now realizing how silly it sounded.”32 
 Indeed, North Korean refugees often experience serious issues in readjusting to 
life outside of North Korea, such is the extent and effectiveness of the North’s 
brainwashing capabilities. A seven-year follow up on the mental health of North 
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Korean defectors in South Korea found that “the cultural aspect of the current stresses 
experienced by North Korean defectors in South Korea seems to be unique, despite 
their common ancestral background.”33 Additionally, the study found that North 
Korean defectors “commonly react with anger as a result of having been deceived for a 
lifetime by the North Korean government.”33 
 Other problems encountered by North Korean refugees are often related to jobs, 
education and social adjustment, which are surely not aided by the South Korean 
government’s recent shift from encouraging to discouraging defections from the 
North.34 Adding to North Korean defector issues is the fact that the Korean language 
has changed; the effects of globalization on the South and the isolationism of the North 
has resulted in the creation of two very distinct dialects. This creates pressure for 
defectors to acquire a more Southern accent, as South Koreans often look down on those 
with a North Korean accent. One defector even said that he “wouldn’t have made any 
friends” if he didn’t make an adjustment to his speech.35 
 North Koreans are also forced to attend weekly hakseup (literally, “education”) 
sessions where they, in the words of one North Korean, “meet in small groups to 
memorize and to write a number of things” like Kim Jong Il’s speeches.36 This bears 
striking similarity to the tyrannical practices of Mao Zedong’s regime in the People’s 
Republic of China, and is worth noting as an interesting parallel between two East 
Asian dictators. In both cases, the purpose of the sessions was to glorify the regime 
under which the people lived. The sessions had the effect of both creating respect for 
the regime as well as creating a deep sense of fear; any form of dissent was (and in the 
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case of North Korea still is) seen as a traitorous act against the regime, which was often 
met with extensive punishment, torture or death in a prison camp.37 
 A commonality between East Germany and North Korea that bears mentioning 
is prison camps. East Germany had 250,000 political prisoners during its existence, 
72,000 of which were jailed due to trying to escape East Germany illegally. There are 
also reports of psychological torment and post-traumatic stress suffered as a result of 
these East German prisons.38 However, most of the punishment from the regime toward 
its dissidents involved “tight observation by the secret police and the active 
manipulation of opposition groups by undercover agents and spies.”39 In North Korea, 
by contrast, even the most minor offense can lead to one’s arrest, such as singing South 
Korean pop music, listening to a foreign radio broadcast or sitting on a newspaper 
photo of the North Korean leader.40 Conditions in North Korean prison camps are also 
far worse than those which were reported in East Germany. Starvation is an everyday 
occurrence, with people forced to eat bugs and feral animals to survive. Most prisoners 
are assigned to some form of forced labor which is designed to quickly kill them off, 
and all sleep in disease-infested cells.41 
 Though there is evidence that East Germany sentenced many political prisoners 
to jail for crimes against the regime and sometimes treated them unfairly, the highly 
uncivilized and cruel form of punishment that instills a deep-seeded fear in the North 
Korean people and keeps the country’s regime in power was simply nonexistent in East 
Germany. In the event of reunification with South Korea, North Korea would have a 
major issue in acclimatizing its people to the South Korean culture (which, as 
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mentioned earlier, many North Korean refugees can already attest to). By contrast, due 
to the better conditions of its political prisons and the lack of a major cultural gap with 
the West, East Germany was able to reunify without its political prisoners posing a 
serious roadblock. 
Economic divisions in Germany and Korea 
 As is the case with both the German model and Korean model, the country ruled 
by an authoritarian regime (East Germany and North Korea) lagged economically 
behind the more liberal and free country (West Germany and South Korea). This 
economic lag creates obvious complications for an attempt at reunification between two 
very different regimes; however, as the German model indicates, it is not only possible 
but can be achieved with a great amount of success. 
 In an analysis by Rüdiger Pohl for Study Abroad completed five years after East 
Germany fell, it was determined that “the dynamic development of economic activity in 
eastern Germany reflects an economic transformation that is heading towards 
success.”42 Remarkably, East Germany was the fastest growing region in Europe at that 
time, and Pohl predicted that by the year 2010 the Eastern German economy would 
have “merged with the economy of western Germany to such an extent that it will no 
longer be separately identifiable.”43 As a disclaimer, however, Pohl added that East 
Germany was still “far from self-sustaining” and would have to temporarily rely on 
special government programs to help it catch up to the West.43 
 By the year 2000, former East Germany had seen even more improvements in its 
economic situation. A study from Applied Psychology: An International Review found that 
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there were more suppliers in the unified Germany as well as a “significant decrease of 
organizational problems.”44 Although a noticeable increase in workload may have 
contributed to higher levels of stress, the increase in job resources (such as job control 
and complexity) likely made up for those negative effects.44 
 Finally, a study published in the British Journal of Sociology found that although 
there had been a minor increase in income inequality experienced in transitioning to a 
free market economy, former East Germany was better off post-reunification in terms of 
household income. Between May 1990 and March 1992 roughly 65 percent of a sample 
of East German households saw an increase in their real household equivalent incomes. 
On average, the study showed, “equivalent incomes increased at an annual rate of 8.4 
percent; a high growth rate by normal international standards.”45 
 However, some negative effects are still being felt within Germany well over two 
decades after its reunification. Unemployment rates in East Germany remain above 
those in West Germany, and former East Germans struggle in comparison to their 
Western counterparts.46 Sociologists at Bielefeld University reported that despite East 
Germans representing 20 percent of the population, under five percent comprise the so-
called “elite” in fields like politics, business and science.47 Another study found that 
“beliefs and attitudes regarding gender roles, have…been shown to persistently diverge 
between West and East Germans, with East Germans embracing more egalitarian 
gender roles.”48 Therefore, although German reunification has been a largely successful 
endeavor economically, it has not occurred without drawbacks. 
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 The economic division between North Korea and South Korea, however, runs far 
deeper than that which existed between East and West Germany, and thus is more 
problematic for a potential reunification. What is not commonly known, however, is 
that originally South Korea was the impoverished, struggling nation, and North Korea 
was the more economically successful of the two. According to an article from 
Soundings, this was largely due to North Korea’s reliance on “the foundations of coal, 
steel and cement,” and until as late as 1984, the North had the ability to aid South 
Korean flood victims.49 South Korea, meanwhile, remained devastated from the Korean 
War for decades and did not even develop a market-based economy until the 1970s. 
 The turning point came with the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of North 
Korea’s largest trading partners. During that time, the North Korean economy “went 
into meltdown,” producing a devastating famine that killed upwards of three million 
North Koreans.49 This unfortunate development begged the question of whether North 
Korea would finally change its extremely isolationist tendencies and institute badly 
needed reforms to ease its suffering. A study for the Australian Journal Of International 
Affairs published in 2009 found that North Korea could potentially have avoided the 
famine but “deliberately missed out on a number of good opportunities to succeed in 
such reforms,” choosing instead to “consistently (lay) the blame upon external threats” 
such as the United States’ so-called “imperialism.”50 Interestingly, however, the article 
further claims that both Western governments and the South Korean government did 
not do “enough to urge, or pressure, North (Korea) to embark on comprehensive 
economic reforms.”50 
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 The result is a country which has been broken economically for over 20 years. 
The North Korean regime has simply been unable to provide many basic needs for its 
own people, forcing many citizens to risk their lives and create their own businesses in 
order to survive. Research from Pacific Review shows that this development of private 
enterprise in North Korea has continued since the famine of the 1990s: while the regime 
“prevented grassroots capitalism from reaching its full potential,” the new informal 
economy supplied almost three quarters of necessities during the famine.51 Even 
members of the North Korean elite have resorted to relying on illegal markets, and 
many of the hundreds of thousands serving in the military “eke out a basic existence 
akin more to ‘conscripted laborers rather than professional combatants.’”52 
 Predictably, the North Korean regime was not pleased with the development of 
these informal markets. A study for the Journal of East Asian Studies found that 
“marketization wreaked havoc with North Korea’s existing social system…reduc(ing) 
the significance of hereditary family background,” a concept which the North Korean 
regime has heavily relied on to keep certain individuals in power and all others out.53 
North Korea thus finds itself in a highly unique predicament: it must balance its 
incredibly restrictive policies with a certain tolerance for the informal economy. Perhaps 
this can help to explain why many North Korean guards engage in (and often get away 
with) “prophylactic bribery”; that is, they are paid off by the new North Korean 
entrepreneurs in exchange for not reporting the entrepreneurs’ activities.54 If North 
Korea wishes to prevent another crippling famine or, far more dangerously for those in 
power, a total collapse of its economy, this forced tolerance is the price it must pay. 
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 Following a Korean reunification, the economic issues reported in the German 
model would no doubt be far more intense for the Korean population and government. 
Though North Korea does not publish reliable reports of its own economic situation, the 
World Factbook published by the Central Intelligence Agency estimates the country’s 
GDP (purchasing power parity) at around $40 billion.55 By comparison, South Korea’s 
GDP (purchasing power parity) lies just under $2 trillion.56 Reunification between two 
countries with such a massive economic disparity between them would be an 
unprecedented effort, with the integration of the North Korean population into the 
South Korean economy clearly posing the most daunting challenge. The fact that former 
East Germany, a geographically smaller and far less populous region than North Korea, 
continues to lag in certain respects behind the rest of Germany, is not good news for the 
North Korean people should their own country collapse. 
East-West German and North-South Korean relations 
 An article written for International Affairs in 1987, two years before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, commemorated the 750th jubilee of the city of Berlin’s founding. Though 
the city had been physically divided for over two decades and ideologically divided for 
even longer, there had existed “a long period of peace which many other regions of the 
world have simply not known.”57 The author himself had served the West German 
government by negotiating over a dozen agreements with East Germany aimed at 
reinforcing the “strong bonds” it already had with West Germany.58 Despite the glaring 
differences that existed between East and West Germany, the two states had a clear 
history of working together on policy measures in an amicable fashion. 
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 This close relationship continued during the reunification process. In an article 
for Harvard International Review, it was noted that West Germany had a “constitutional 
and moral commitment to one Germany” and had previously offered East Germans 
automatic citizenship (and the wealth of social welfare benefits which that entailed) if 
they were able to cross into West Germany.59 From a political perspective, an article for 
German Politics determined that “reunification has had little or no perceptible impact on 
the European policy of Germany.”60 Many of the highest positions in the German 
government (such as those in the Ministry of Finance) did not change in the years 
following reunification, and the consensus of the article was that “political stability 
(was) underpinned by technocratic stability.”60 In short, although economic problems 
inevitably plagued Germany’s reunification (as outlined in the previous section), the 
generosity of Western Germany and the passion for a united Germany harbored by East 
Germans significantly eased the pains of reunification. 
 The relationship between North Korea and South Korea, however, has been far 
more strained and contentious. The most obvious and dramatic example of their 
antagonism towards each other was the Korean War, although a series of incidents 
along the North-South Korean border, as well as continued provocations from North 
Korea, have added to the tensions between the two countries.  
 Following the Korean War, an armistice, not a formal peace treaty, was signed, 
meaning North Korea and South Korea are still technically at war with each other.61 
North Korea is often blamed for provoking its neighbor and subsequently worsening 
inter-Korean relations throughout the years since the Korean war, and rightfully so. 
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One study published in Pacific Relations found that North Korea began to institute 
guerrilla-style warfare against the South during the 1960s.62 In 1966 the North Korean 
army killed six American soldiers and a South Korean soldier in a raid; in January 1968 
the North made an assassination attempt on South Korean president Park Chung-Hee; 
and only two days later successfully captured an American reconnaissance vessel.62 
State Department intelligence also revealed that North Korea hoped to prevent the 
South Korean government from sending combat troops and aiding the Americans 
during the Vietnam War through “military infiltration.”63 
 These findings were confirmed by a separate study published for the Journal of 
East Asian studies, claiming that North Korea’s “rhetoric and behavior is routinely 
aggressive and militaristic.”64 The study also dismissed the idea that United States-
South Korean joint military exercises in close proximity to the Korean border provoked 
the aggressive responses seen periodically from the North, with the author stating that 
North Korea’s “response to US and South Korean joint exercises is not unique and not 
systematically different from regular (North Korean) activity.”65 Therefore, whether the 
exercises take place or not, the United States and South Korea should continue to expect 
the usual barrage of hostile signals from North Korea. 
 Perhaps the worst blow to inter-Korean relations since the signing of the 
armistice in 1953 came in 2010, with the sinking of South Korean vessel Cheonan (which 
killed 46 people) and the shelling of South Korean island Yeonpyeong (which killed 
four people).66 This spurred a buildup of the South Korean army and a strengthening of 
South Korean-American relations. The event also underlined an important facet of the 
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military divide between North and South Korea: an article published in the Naval War 
College Review found that while the North had the advantage in terms of numbers and 
the South in terms of quality, “an overall comparative assessment of asymmetric quality 
and quantity shows that the two sides are roughly equivalent.”67 The number of 
hostilities between the two countries, as well as their differences in military makeup, 
would therefore complicate any reunification attempt. 
 Another important component of the North-South Korean relationship is the 
contrast in the two countries’ stances on human rights. A study published for Critical 
Asian Studies found that the two countries embody wholly different philosophies on the 
subject: in the North, economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR) are emphasized, 
while in the South it is civil and political rights (CPR) that are accorded precedence.68 
Despite this, however, both countries are guilty of repressing freedom of speech. In the 
2014 book “The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History,” the author discloses that under 
Park Chung-Hee’s administration, “security organs worked hard to stifle the Korean 
press…Korean Central Intelligence Agency operatives came daily to major 
newspapers…to tell them what news they could or could not report.”69 Further, those 
who dissented “were called in for grilling and often beaten.”69 
 Particularly relevant to this research, however, is the discourse the two countries 
have exchanged regarding potential reunification efforts. There was a brief period 
during the 1970s when North and South Korea engaged in secret talks dealing directly 
with the subject, with delegations from both countries covertly crossing the border 
repeatedly for negotiations. Perhaps the most important of these meetings occurred in 
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1972 between Kim Il Sung, the founder and supreme leader of North Korea, and Lee Hu 
Rack, then head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. The dialogue between the 
two men broached reunification, with Lee declaring that “unification should be 
achieved by ourselves without interference of the four powers.”70 Kim agreed with this 
sentiment, and, though he dubiously claimed he had no knowledge of it, also took the 
time to apologize for the assassination attempt on President Park. In hindsight, the talks 
clearly did not culminate in reunification, but they did reveal that both countries, nearly 
20 years after the end of the Korean war, did seriously consider reunification. 
 Finally, an extremely important issue that warrants mentioning is North Korea’s 
nuclear capability. In response to a North Korean long-range missile test on February 7, 
2016, South Korea suspended operations of an inter-Korean manufacturing park and 
initiated discussions with the United States regarding the installation of a missile 
defense system known as THAAD. There has been much debate in South Korea about 
whether these decisions are appropriate, with the author of an article for World Affairs 
calling them “the right calls at the wrong time.”71 However, it is telling that South Korea 
feels compelled to take such actions against North Korea; the closure of one of the few 
inter-Korean businesses in existence is a clear sign of the very strained relations 
between the two countries. 
 
 
Content analysis 
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 As mentioned in the methods section, the content analysis portion of this 
research is to help quantify the results of the various studies and information gathered 
in the comparative case study. Below is a graph which identifies the three variables 
examined in the comparative case study and the major themes associated with the 
German and Korean models (indicated by the sources associated with each variable). 
Korean Model German Model 
Cultural divisions 
- Indoctrination/brainwashing in North Korea 
- Torture camps prevalent in the North, similar to Mao’s 
China 
- Major ideological split - communist in the North, 
democratic in the South 
- Language divide – the Korean culture remains largely 
intact, but refugees from North Korea encounter 
serious issues when attempting to integrate 
Cultural divisions 
- Significant ideological differences between the East 
and West 
- Secret police prevalent in East Germany; thousands of 
political prisoners taken between 1961 and 1989. 
- Language remained intact despite division 
- Reunification ameliorated by unity of German culture 
Economic divisions 
- North Korea the stronger country until 1984, now the 
South’s economy dwarfs the North’s. 
- North Korea survived the fall of the Soviet Union, but 
its economy irreversibly collapsed. 
- Refusal from North Korea to implement meaningful 
economic reforms. 
- North Korea is now forced to tolerate black markets to 
a greater extent than ever before. 
Economic divisions 
- Communist East Germany very underdeveloped when 
compared to the West 
- Economy grew substantially following reunification - 
was the fastest growing region in Europe 
- East Germany still currently lags behind the West in 
terms of unemployment and overall prosperity 
Inter-Korean relations 
- Extremely hostile relationship dating back to the 
Korean War 
- Brief, failed attempts to negotiate reunification during 
the 1970s 
- Technically both Koreas are still at war with each other 
- North Korean nuclear threat 
Inter-German relations 
- Ideologically and physically divided, though the East-
West German border was somewhat permeable 
- Mostly peaceable relationship - idea of “one Germany” 
- Reunification facilitated by willingness from both sides 
(particularly the West) to work together 
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 Upon examination of the graph, one can easily discern that the Korean and 
German models share a surprising number of commonalities. In particular, despite the 
presence of a North and South Korea and an East and West Germany, the Korean and 
German cultures remained preserved as single entities. Additionally, both communist 
regimes implemented a form of secret police to control their populations, lagged 
economically behind their Western counterparts to a significant degree, seriously 
considered reunification at some point in their pasts and could be contrasted with their 
democratic, capitalist counterparts. Based on the sources from the comparative case 
study, then, there appear to be five major similarities which the German and Korean 
models of reunification share. 
 In terms of Korea’s culture, North and South Korea’s division in the 1940s 
appears to have occurred relatively recently when one considers that the two countries 
had been unified for thousands of years prior. Therefore, it is unsurprising that 
Confucianism, which has been a presence on the peninsula for centuries, has continued 
to manifest itself in both North and South Korea. For example, in a publication for 
Korean Studies it was claimed that the rigorous North Korean “Juche” ideology imposed 
by founder Kim Il Sung had elements which reflected those espoused by Confucianism, 
particularly those of “authority, bureaucracy, hierarchy, patriarchy, and respect for 
elders.”72  
Similarly, an article for the Journal of Contemporary Asia wrote that South Korea’s 
major economic development after the Korean War was due to the need for “new 
workers to accept industrial norms of work discipline, punctuality, (and) management 
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authority” - all of which reflect Confucian ideals.73 In addition, all South Korean 
businesses are structured hierarchically, where workers are expected to give an almost 
suffocating degree of respect to their superiors.74 Yet in South Korea, times are 
beginning to change; it was noted in an article for Pacific Affairs that today, “Korea has 
an unusually large elderly workforce and a disproportionately small young 
workforce.”75 Should that trend continue, the extent of Confucianism’s presence in 
Korea may prove to be a division rather than a similarity between the North and the 
South. 
 In terms of the German culture, it was noted in the case study that the 
preservation of Germany’s culture was aided by a more porous border and a 
comparatively brief period of division between the East and West. Though 
Confucianism is not prevalent in German society as it is in Korea, the German culture 
remained linked via a common language, a largely nonviolent coexistence and a 
willingness by the German population on both sides of the border to reunify. Though 
cultural differences inevitably did emerge between the two countries (such as an 
unwillingness by many East Germans to accept democracy over socialism), none were 
so great as to display two distinct German cultures within one Germany after 
reunification.76 
 Clearly, however, there are also important differences. For one, East and West 
Germany never declared war against each other, whereas the Korean War continues to 
define the very essence of the relationship between North and South Korea. North 
Korea is also far more of an isolationist nation and even more economically destitute 
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than East Germany ever was, and its longstanding division with South Korea has led to 
the result of two distinct Korean dialects (whereas the German language remained 
essentially unchanged). Finally, North Korea has developed, tested and threatened the 
use of nuclear weapons, all of which are demonstrations of power that never existed in 
the East German regime. In total, the content analysis indicates that there are at least 
eight major differences between the German and Korean models of reunification. 
 With respect to reunification, then, it would appear that the disparities outlined 
in this content analysis are significant. North and South Korea have been divided for 
over 60 years, maintain a warlike attitude toward each other, are economically 
incomparable and have evolved into culturally separate entities. Though Germany 
experienced many of these issues, they were never to the extreme degree present in the 
Korean model. West Germany was able to successfully reincorporate East Germany and 
helped to develop its economy at a remarkably quick pace. The East German regime 
was also complicit, allowing a full takeover of Western ideals and capitalism. Given the 
history of power-hungry practices and the deep-seeded hatred of the West present in 
North Korea, it is difficult to imagine that such a transformative process would occur as 
smoothly as it did in Germany. 
 Another finding from the content analysis is the clear discrepancy in the isolation 
of the communist regimes populations. Many East Germans were well-educated, lived 
relatively well and had regular employment. The vast majority of North Koreans, 
however, are wholly ignorant of much of the world, including the state of international 
affairs in general, as well as the history and politics of their own country. The fact that 
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North Korean defectors encounter so many issues when attempting to integrate into 
South Korean society should serve as a clear warning sign to South Korea and its 
neighbors; if North Korea were to disappear tomorrow and its 24 million people had 
nowhere to go, it could easily become the world’s most serious humanitarian crisis. It 
would also have enormous cultural effects, most of which would certainly be negative; 
the blunt hostility of the North towards the South and the apathetic attitudes of the 
South towards the North could provide the catalyst for another war. At the very least, 
however, it would prove to be an overwhelming task for South Korea to handle and 
manage on its own. 
Conclusions 
 Many published works on North Korea broach the topic of Korean reunification 
briefly, some of which were mentioned in the literature review.  Other studies address 
Korean reunification much more directly. For example, a study by Jin-Wook Shin from 
Chung-Ang University, entitled “Lessons from German Reunification for Inter-Korean 
Relations: An Analysis of South Korean Public Spheres, 1920-2010,” analyzed in-depth 
the many varying opinions of South Korean intellectuals, journalists, and policymakers 
regarding German reunification.77 According to Shin, in the years following German 
reunification, progressives in South Korea tended to view the so-called “unification by 
absorption” of East Germany negatively, claiming that West Germany “achieved 
unification as a result of the capitalist logic and bankruptcy of people’s 
consciousness.”78 Conservatives took the opposite approach, however, and this division 
among South Korea’s intellectuals led to the “constructive learning process” becoming 
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“seriously hindered.”79 Another hindrance Shin details is that many of the people and 
newspapers espousing these views did so merely for political motivation, and therefore 
with little to no real consideration given towards a potential reunification. In the end, 
Shin concludes, “…in South Korea, much has been said about German unification but 
little has been learned from it.”80 
 Similarly, a study conducted by Stefan Niederhafner from Seoul National 
University found that South Korea would in all likelihood not be able to follow the 
German model of reunification. This conclusion was reached by identifying factors that 
proved to be challenging in German reunification and analyzing them under the South 
Korean umbrella. Issues discussed included the application of South Korean law on 
North Korea, which could result in the potential imprisonment of literally “every North 
Korean citizen outside the North Korean political prison camps,”81 as well as the 
dissolution of North Korean political parties and the reconciliation of the two countries’ 
monetary and economic systems.  Ultimately, Niederhafner found that “…it is in South 
Korea’s own interests to continue to approach North Korea and keep offering 
cooperation,” but that “a sudden implosion of the North Korean system…would 
threaten the functioning, if not the existence, of the South Korean system as well.”82 
 Careful review of the two sources cited above, as well as those explored in the 
comparative case study and the findings of the content analysis, indicates that the 
German model for reunification is largely inapplicable to the potential Korean model 
for reunification. Despite the many similarities shared by the two models, such as the 
ideological and physical divisions that once defined Germany and continue to define 
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Korea, as well as the fact that both the Korean and German cultures have remained 
intact despite division, there are an equal if not greater number of differences which 
make the comparison very limited at best.  
 The uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of a Korean reunification has added 
considerable difficulty to this research. As outlined earlier, the academic community 
remains highly divided on the subject; some scholars posit that a North Korean collapse 
will occur inevitably, while others argue that it can theoretically continue to subsist on 
its meager economy and with the aid of China indefinitely. The fact remains, however, 
that were North Korea to collapse, the events immediately following it would unfold 
very differently than the fall of the Berlin Wall and East Germany’s subsequent 
reunification with West Germany did. 
 North Korea’s severe isolation and the lack of reliable data surrounding the 
conditions inside the country also hampered this project. East German data was 
similarly opaque, but with the advantages of hindsight one can make judgments 
regarding its accuracy far more easily. It is difficult to discuss, critique and evaluate a 
country when so little information is known about it. Although unlikely, the emergence 
of scientifically valid data about the general state of North Korea, its economy and 
population would greatly improve the reliability of the Korean model in this research. 
 The findings of this comparative case study and content analysis may still prove 
useful in forwarding the discussion of potential Korean reunification. It would be in 
South Korea’s best interest to look beyond the German model when taking steps to 
prepare for reunification. Tolerable relations with the other country, a willingness of the 
KOREAN UNIFICATION  34 
people at large to reunify and the economic preparedness necessary to absorb the 
enormous shock of the collapse of the failing country are factors that are simply 
nonexistent in South Korea, yet those are the variables which enabled West Germany to 
successfully reunify with East Germany.  
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